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LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE KEFAUVER INVESTIGATION
Joseph L. Nelis The author was formerly Associate Counsel, Special Committee to Investigate
Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce (S. Res. 202); Counsel, Office of Price
Administration; Consultant, Economic Cooperation Administration. Presently Special
Counsel, New York State Crime Commission; Special Counsel, Special Committee to
Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce (S. Res. 202); Partner,
Dunning, Nellis & Lundin, Washington, D. C.-EDrroR.

From observation and investigation in fourteen of the principal cities
of our country, it appears that most large city government is in the
hands of an entrenched machine that has perpetuated itself in office for
many years. Obviously such a situation is not conducive to the best law
enforcement. In fact, the Kefauver Committee has found that the most
corruption stems from the fact that police and city officials who have
been long in office and who control law enforcement seem somewhat indifferent to the enforcement of gambling laws. They fail to realize
or are intentionally and understandably blind to the proven fact, that,
gambling, itself illegal in all states but one, provides vast sums of money
to hoodlum elements with which these undesirables carry on more
vicious forms of illegal activity such as the prostitution and narcotic
trades. Our municipalities are making great strides in every field of
city government except in law enforcement in some cases. Even in these
circumstances, the Committee's revelations have awakened the citizenry
and improvements have been noted in such cities as Chicago, Philadelphia, New York, Miami and many others.
The essential function of the Kefauver Committee was to obtain facts
concerning the use of the channels of interstate commerce by organized
criminals. The Report of the Committee issued on May 1, 1951, attests
to the successful discovery of these facts, but the by-products of the most
famous Congressional investigation of modem times have been great
and many. These by-products may be thought of in terms of three
general categories: First, the exposure to the public of criminal gangs
and how they operate; Secondly, the individual instances wherein, as a
direct result of Committee revelations, local grand juries have been
formed and new state, as well as volunteer, crime commissions have
sprung into action; and Thirdly, the novel and interesting legal questions
which have arisen as a result of Committee hearings and procedures.
Perhaps the most interesting subjects to lawyers and the legal profession generally, which are closely identified with the Committee's hearings, are the legal issues raised by witnesses who have been cited for
contempt of the Committee by the Senate, as well as the questions yet to
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be determined concerning those witnesses whose testimony appears to
be at variance with the facts. 1
In order to fully appreciate the legal problems here involved it would
perhaps be useful to review briefly the steps required by law to be taken
by a Congressional Committee before it puts witnesses on the stand.
First, the Committee must authorize the hearing pursuant to its own
rules and those of the Senate. If there is lack of compliance with the
rule, for example, that a majority of the Committee must approve the
holding of a hearing, there is a possibility that a witness might successfully defend himself against perjury on the assertion that no competent
tribunal exists, since the taking of testimony was not authorized by the
majority of the Committee which alone has this power. 2
In a recent case 3 the Supreme Court held that the quorum requirement
with respect to the authorization of hearings is not fully applicable in an
action for contempt, by reason of failure either to respond to a subpoena
or to produce the books and records called for. The Bryan opinion
seems to indicate that no quorum of the Committee would have to be
present in order for a court to adjudge a person guilty of contempt for
refusals to answer.
These issues become of material importance when it is recognized that
a great many of the hearings of the Committee were conducted by a
subcommittee of one (in the majority of instances, Senator Kefauver,
the Chairman). Concerning a given resolution of the Committee authorizing a subcommittee of one to take testimony, objections most often
raised by counsel for witnesses were twofold: First, that no quorum of
the Committee was present; and Secondly, that the questions asked were
not "pertinent" to the inquiry.
The Committee, by resolution early in its life, authorized the Chairman to issue and sign all subpoenas. Lawyers for prospective witnesses
have raised questions as to his authority to do so. The Congressional
practice has been for some time that Committee chairmen have the
authority to issue subpoenas without any formal resolution, and a House
4
precedent for this action dating back to 1837 has been long established.
S.R. 202, which established the Kefauver Committee, authorized delegation of the subpoena power to a subcommittee. In effect, therefore, the
1. The recent convictions of James J. Moran and Louis Weber for perjury before the
Committee (New York, March 1951) are the first two of a number of scheduled perjury
trials.
2.

Christoffel v. U.S., 338 U.S. 84 (1949).

3.
4.

U.S. v. Bryan, 70 Sup. Ct. 724 (1950).
In re R. M. Whitney, 3 Hinds' Precedents, Section 1668.
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Committee authorized the Chairman to act as a subcommittee of one in
regard to the issuance of subpoenas.
With this brief background I now turn to an examination of the contempt problem itself as it relates specifically to the work of the Committee. There are certain fundamental precepts which must borne in
mind: Witnesses appearing before a Congressional Committee have no
privilege with respect to the Fifth Amendment as to answers that would
tend to incriminate them only under state law.5 The Committee was
required to and did respect the privilege where an answer would tend to
incriminate a witness under Federal law, even though under the present
Congressional immunity statute, weak as it is, no Federal prosecution
could result from any admissions made by the witness in response to
such a question.
In my opinion, the great majority of the thirty-three witnesses cited
by the Senate for contempt of the Committee asserted a privilege against
incriminating themselves of state offenses, and it is my belief that the
courts will not sustain these assertions upon individual examination of
the law and facts. In U. S. v. Hoffman, decided June, 1951, the Supreme
Court upheld the right of a witness to decline, upon the grounds of selfincrimination under the Fifth Amendment, to answer the question:
"What is.your business?" In that case, the evidence showed that the
defendant, cited for contempt of a Committee of the Congress, properly
asserted the privilege since the Court thought that his answer would
tend to incriminate him of a Federal offense. Because of the unnecessarily broad scope of the opinion, however, it is believed that the decision
will have a peculiarly limiting effect upon the contempt indictments currently pending. Mr. Justice Clark recommended that the Congress pass
an effective immunity statute to avoid the necessity of not being able to
obtain material information where a witness properly asserts his Constitutional privilege.
Court action for contempt of Congress 6 is based upon a certification
to the Senate by the Committee, accompanied by a resolution and a
report upon which the Senate votes. If the vote is in favor of the citation, the President of the Senate certifies the record to the United States
Attorney for the District in which the contempt was committed, and Section 192 becomes applicable, providing, upon conviction, imprisonment
for not less than one month nor more than twelve months and a fine of
5. U.S. v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Feldman v. U.S. 322 U.S. 487 (1944); U.S. v.
St. Pierce, 128 F.(2d) 979 (1942).
6. 2 U.S.C., Sections 192 and 194.
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not more than one thousand dollars nor less than one hundred dollars
for each count.
The question has arisen as to whether, once a contempt of the Committee has been committed, a United States Attorney may cause the
indictment of the witness on his own motion,7 or whether it is necessary
for the United States Attorney to withhold action in presenting the
matter to the grand jury until the contempt is certified to him by the
President of the Senate. This question arises because Sections 192 and
194 present doubts about the proper procedure to be taken in such cases.
If Section 192 stood alone, there would be no problem, because the
general provisions of Title 28, U.S.C., require the United States Attorney to prosecute crimes against the United States and authorize grand
juries to inquire into crimes brought to their knowledge and to return
indictments. However, Section 194 provides in detail for the certification of contempts by the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the
House to United States Attorneys, who, in turn, are to be directed to
8
present the matter to the grand juries. The authorities are in conflict.
The Committee legal staff has tended toward the view that Section 194
is mandatory, rather than permissive, and that certification by the President of the Senate is necessary, although in the case of O'Hara it encouraged the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois to proceed under Section 192 in the hope that the Court would
clarify the confusion in favor of the more time-saving procedure adopted
by Mr. Kerner, United States Attorney for the Northern District of
Illinois.
Among the most interesting problems which the courts will be called
upon to resolve in connection with contempts committed before the
Committee are the refusals of certain witnesses to testify before the
television cameras. In St. Louis, James J. Carroll, a self-described
"betting commissioner" offered to testify fully and freely if the television
cameras were turned off. In New York, Frank Costello objected to the
televising of his face, and the television audience was treated to an excellent view of his well-manicured hands throughout his testimony. In
Washington, Cleveland mobsters Morris Kleinman and Louis Rothkopf
asserted that their right not to be televised was based, not upon the usual
claim of incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, but rather that the
televising of their voices and faces was an invasion of their right to
7. As in the case of U.S. v. Ralph J. O'Hara, indicted by the Grand Jury, Northern District of Illinois, December, 1950.
8. Ex parte Frankfeld, 32 F. Sup. 915 (194-0) ; U.S. v. Josephson, 165 F.(2d)
In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).

82 (1947);
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privacy and, in addition, subjected them to varying degrees of "mikefright," making it impossible for them to testify fully and frankly. The
Committee has had reason to believe that none of these claims were
honestly asserted.
Since these matters are now before the courts, or are in varying
degrees of preparation for the courts, it would not be desirable to
comment fully on the various defenses asserted. Nevertheless, I believe
it fair and proper to comment that the courts have held that judges may
not pass upon the propriety of a Congressional Committee's hearings
unless they transgress authority committed to them by Congress, or ride
rough-shod over the constitutional rights of citizens. 9 It is difficult to
understand what substantive difference exists between a public hearing
held in a room that accommodates thirty people, an auditorium that
might accommodate five thousand people, or the televising and broadcasting of a public hearing in pursuit of a legal legislative purpose and
conducted with dignity and propriety.
In spite of my belief, so stated, I should add that I privately hope
that the Senate, the House, and the national associations of broadcasters
and telecasters will soon create and put into effect a code of conduct
which, by its limitations, will prevent the abuses many people legitimately
feel might follow as a result of a widespread use of television at Congressional and other public hearings.
To the layman contradictory statements of witnesses as to a given
set of facts firmly establish a case of perjury. As lawyers, we know
that the contradictory statements elicited from witnesses at Congressional hearings' 0 do not necessarily establish a case of perjury under
the present perjury statute, 18 U.S.C., Section 1621, as interpreted by
the courts. This Section requires the prosecuting attorney to prove
that the witness knew his testimony was false at the time he gave it,":
that the matter concerning which the perjured testimony was given was
material to the issues,'1 2 and that there has been corroborative testimony
on the part of other witnesses. In the face of these requirements it is
obvious that much of the alleged perjured testimony given to the Committee must be tested by the rather rigid requirements of the statute, as
distinguished from mere contradictory assertions before the Committee.
In its Third Interim Report the Committee recognizes this fact.
9. Dennis v. U.S., 171 F.(2d) 986, cert. granted 337 U.S. 954 (1950) ; Eisler v. U.S., 170
F.(2d) 273, cert. dismissed 337 U.S. 954 (1948).
10. As, for example, the testimony of John Crane, Louis Weber, James Moran, and William O'Dwyer before the Committee in New York, March, 1951.
11. U.S. v. Otto, 54 F.(2d) 277 (1931); Fotie v. U.S., 137 F.(2d) 831 (1943).
12. Carroll v. U.S., 16 F.(2d) 951 (1927) ; Morford v. U.S., 176 F.(2d) 54- (1949) ; U.S. v.
Hirsch, 136 F.(2d) 976; Marshal v. U.S., 176 F.(2d) 473 (194-9).
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Various immunity statutes have been enacted in order to obtain evidence which could not otherwise be obtained because of the prohibition
of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution against compelling a person
"in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The Committee
has often expressed its opinion that the existing statutes do not afford
complete immunity and thereby prevent a legislative committee from
obtaining facts material to its inquiry. The Attorney General has
recommended that Section 3486 of Title 18, United States Code, be
amended to provide a complete bar against prosecution or penalty on
account of any matter concerning which a person is compelled to testify
after he has asserted his Constitutional privilege. It is highly necessary
and desirable that such legislation be enacted at the earliest practicable
date. The Committee was deprived of much useful and relevant information as a result of its inability to give immunity to witnesses
engaged in interstate criminal activities, where policy would dictate the
granting of immunity rather than subjecting a witness to the possibility
of a conviction for contempt.
Another legal question broadly raised by counsel for hostile witnesses
relates to the pertinency or relevancy of the questions asked to the scope
of the inquiry. In cases in the Supreme Court, dating from 192913 and
up to the present time, 14 it has been held that Congressional investigations are limited to questioning which is pertinent to the inquiry and
within the scope of the authority of the resolution creating the Committee.
The standards of pertinency in an investigation such as one into
organized crime are undoubtedly broad enough to cover all the questions
asked by the Committee. In the Barsky case the Court held that books
and records and correspondence of an association which collected relief
funds, and which may have spent some of the funds for pro-Communist
propaganda, were relevant to an inquiry under which a Committee of
the House was authorized to iiiquire into "subversive and un-American
propaganda that . . . attacks the principle of the form of government

as guaranteed by our Constitution."'"
It is believed that the Committee rightly held that events remote in
time, such as a criminal record dating many years back, could easily
be shown to have relevance to the pattern of organized crime today and
to be within the scope of the Senate Resolution authorizing the Committee to function. The question of pertinency was raised largely by
13.
14.
15.

Sinclair v. U.S., 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
Barsky v. U.S., 167 F.(2d) 241, cert. denied 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
167 F.(2d), at page 247.
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counsel whose clients were sought to be questioned on their activities in
bootlegging days. They generally objected to these questions, saying
that the events were remote in point of time and the records of the individual were before the Committee anyway; but it is obvious, as stated
in the Third Interim Report of the Committee, that the pattern of
organized crime operating in interstate commerce did not just come into
being overnight. The associations and contacts which the criminal
gangs of the roaring thirties established among themselves are the focal
point of the arrangements maintained today by these selfsame individuals in the gambling, narcotic, counterfeiting, and white slave
businesses. Therefore, events remote in time to which most of the
objections by counsel were directed were obviously pertinent to the
Committee's inquiry.
Again, other objections based upon relevancy were raised against
attempts by the Committee to inquire into legitimate business activities
of hostile witnesses. The argument there was that, since the witness
was engaged in a legitimate business, it was without the scope of the
Committee's authority to' inquire into that business. This argument
fails, in my opinion, for the same reason noted above in the case of
objections directed to remoteness of events. The Committee obviously
had the duty of ferreting out the extent to which racketeers and criminals
had infiltrated legitimate businesses and the extent to which, in those
businesses, they used methods of coercion, restraint, and monopoly.
It is clear from the record taken in fourteen states, covering activities
in thirty-five states, that those relatively few witnesses who refused to
answer questions on alleged Constitutional grounds in large part decided
that they would rather risk a trial for contempt of the Senate than
answer the Committee's questions about their activities, incomes, and
associations. It may be that in some cases this gamble will pay off. It
is to be hoped, however, that the courts will not reward the recalcitrant
few by a strained interpretation of what appears to me perfectly clear
law.
Finally, I should add a word about the critics. By and large the
Committee's efforts have been widely applauded. In some cases, constructive criticism of the Committee's procedures have resulted in immediate improvements. But for those very few who saw in this work
of monumental legislative proportions nothing but an opportunity to
carp on personalities, I can only say that our democracy is a strange and
wonderful thing. Whatever a critic's motives, and whatever the extent
of public notice of his destructive comments, the record achieved by the
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Committee in terms of doing the job it set out to do, with dignity and
due regard for the rights of individuals, speaks for itself.
Renewed efforts by Senator Kefauver to procure the adoption of a
Congressional Code of Conduct for Investigations attests to the desire
of those most experienced in legislative inquiries that such inquiries, so
necessary to our democratic way of life, be conducted in a fair and
dignified manner.

